Abstract-In order to access sensitive documents shared over government, army and enterprise intranets, users rely on an in dexing facility where they can quickly locate relevant documents they are allowed to access, (1) without leaking information about the remaining documents, (2) without imposing large load on the receptionist, and (3) with a balanced load on the index servers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of secret documents shared over government, army and enterprise intranets is growing rapidly. How to ef fectively manage these secret documents? Building an inverted index over the collection of secret documents may is a good choice [1] . The inverted index consists of a couple of data structures, namely lexicon and posting lists. The former stores all the distinct terms contained in documents. The latter is an array of list storing terms occurrences within the document collection. Current search engines mostly take the inverted index to store information, such as Google [2] . In order to prevent leakage of sensitive information, access control is the most widely used way. We take the access control based on role and user to prevent unauthorized users from accessing information. However, storing plain text in the inverted index is not secure for secret documents because an adversary who gains access to the index files can access sensitive data, thus, bypassing the access control mechanism. Although encrypting the index can prevent data from being illegally stolen, however, it will lead to large computational overhead. In order to obtain high efficiency, only the lexicon needs to be encrypted because the document can be only derived from lexicon in the index.
Although the term appears in the index as ciphertext, there is still a risk of statistical attack for this strategy because the highly frequent terms have a long posting list. To put it simply, the attackers can learn the rule of posting list from the frequency of terms. Then they can estimate the encrypted terms through the length of the posting lists. In this paper, we propose a strategy that a term is encrypted with a random key. Thus, even if the key of a term is cracked, it will not pose a threat to the other terms.
The amount of secret documents stored in some intranets reaches at the terabyte range. If this volume of data were stored and indexed on a single computer, queries would take many seconds to evaluate even with the most efficient index representations and query resolution methods. To handle the necessary data volumes and query throughput rates, paral lel computing systems are used, in which the documents and index data are split across tightly-clustered distributed computing systems. The main distributed indexing methods include document-distributed index and term-distributed index. Each processing server stores the index corresponding to a subset of the documents in a document-distributed system. Queries are processed in parallel at all servers, and collated back into a single combined answer when all servers have completed their local processing. The document distribution has good scalability and load balancing, while it has low search efficiency. In a term-distributed system, each of the processing servers maintains complete index information for a subset of the terms in the collection, and each query is referred to the subset of the servers that hold relevant information. The term distribution has compact index and high search efficiency, while there is an evident lack of balance in the distribution on the load of its servers [3] . In this paper, we propose a load balanced term distribution strategy to retain the advantages of term distribution, and to improve the load unbalance.
A distributed search system usually consists of the follow ing components: client, receptionist and query processor. A receptionist, is called as the management server in our system, receives queries from client computers, and makes decisions on how to route these queries to different query processors of the system. The query processors, or so-called index servers, hold index or document information, which are used to retrieve and prepare the presentation of results, respectively. In a standard query resolution method, the receptionist receives a query, requests the index information for the query terms from the pertinent index servers, and processes this infor mation centrally. This strategy has the drawback of a severe bottleneck at the receptionist. An alternative is the pipelined term-distributed evaluation strategy proposed by Moffat et al. [4] , where the query processing is distributed across the index servers. However, pipelined search will increase the search delay because the search is done on the index servers one by one. We propose the dynamic pipelined search to trade off the bottleneck and the delay. If the communication load of the management server is high, we take full pipe lined search to decrease the load, namely the search request is routed directly to the index servers and then the search is done on the index servers linearly. If the load of the management server is low, the search request is divided into multiple sub-queries and forwarded to pertinent index servers.
To address these problems, we propose Mimirl, a distributed retrieval system for secret documents. In order to improve security, Mimir uses the cipher index and the access control to protect sensitive information, and encrypts the terms in the index with random key to reduce the risk of statistical attack, and takes partial key update strategy to decrease the potential risk of attack by malicious users. To improve system performance, Mimir only encrypts the terms in the index to decrease the cost of decryption and improve the retrieval effi ciency, and constructs the distributed index based on the load balanced term distribution for secret documents to balance the load of the index servers, and achieves the distributed query based on dynamic pipe lined search strategy to improve the load of the management server and the search delay. Mimir not only guarantees the safety of secret documents, but also the efficiency of the retrieval system. This paper is organized as follows. Related work is pre sented in section 2. In section 3, we describe Mimir in details from load balanced term distribution, random key, partial key update, access control and dynamic pipe lined search. Section 4
evaluates the performance through experiments. We conclude and summarize the results in section 5.
II. RELATED WORK
Index security has been addressed by many researches, where the goal is to secure the secret documents from unau thorized access. Typically a system must provide two ways to achieve security: access control and data encryption [5] . Of the two, access control is a relatively older way to protect sensitive data. Currently, the access control for documents usually is discretionary access control (DAC) strategy [6] or role-based access control (RBAC) [7] , [8] . Zerber [9] proposed a based user-group access control for index, in which a user can belong to multiple groups, but a document can only be owned by one group. This strategy is not very flexible because the user must belong to the group containing the document if he/she wants to access the document. Mimir uses the access control based on role and user, in which the roles and users can be authorized at the same time, to increase system flexibility.
Encryption is a standard technique for storing data confiden tially [10] . Bertino [11] provides a framework for policy-based protection ofXML data by encryption. Seitz [12] proposed an architecture that allows users to store and share encrypted data To handle the large-scale secret documents, the secret documents and index should be distributed to multiple index servers. There is a substantial literature on distribution meth ods. Li et al. [15] distribute index contains fuzzy keywords and encrypted files into the cloud servers. This strategy can provide an effective fuzzy keyword search over encrypted cloud data.
According to the principle of confidentiality, however, the sensitive data should be stored in its own dedicated servers.
The distribution methods can be broadly categorized into two types: document distributed and term distributed schemes.
Harman et al. [16] described a document distributed system that was successfully deployed in practice. Cahoon et al. [17] found that increasing the number of nodes used to manage a fixed-size collection could improve response, with diminishing returns. Probably the best-known document distributed system is Google [18] , in which the cluster of servers maintain a document distributed index and other servers store information such as the documents themselves. The major drawback of document partitioned system is that servers execute operations unnecessarily when querying sub-collections, which may con tain only few or no relevant documents. In term distribution researches, Ricardo A. Baeza-Yates et al [19] [20] found the overhead at the top process is a serious bottleneck with term-distributed mechanism. Since the major overhead comes from the search for retrieval systems, we can balance this problem through the pipelined search which will be discussed later. Webber et al. [4] showed that term partitioning resulted in lower utilization of resources. More specifically, it significantly reduces the number of disk accesses and the volume of data exchanged. Although term distributed scheme has good efficiency for search, but it will result in load imbalance of the index servers. In this paper, to improve the retrieval efficiency and balance load, we takes load balanced term distribution strategy to build distributed index for secret documents.
In the case of the term distributed system, there is an evident lack of balance in the distribution on the load of the management server. In this paper, we use the terms of "management server" and "receptionist" interchangeably. To solve this problem, Xi et al. [21] proposed a hybrid method, where each inverted list is broken into k fixed-size chunks and one chunk is held on each node. However, this strategy can not utilize the advantages of document distribution and term
distribution. An approach to eliminate the bottleneck of the management server is to use pipelining [22] . In this approach, the query is evaluated in stage by the sequence of servers that hold the inverted lists corresponding to the query terms.
Evaluation of the query begins on first index server, which processes the posting lists corresponding to query terms to produce a set of accumulators. This set is passed to the next index server, which processes the lists for query terms against these accumulators to produce a modified set. The rest can be done in the same manner. Finally the last index server produces a final set of accumulators and returns it to the management server. However, the pipe lined search will increase the delay of search. In this paper, We propose the dynamic pipelined search to trade off the bottleneck and the delay.
III. MIMIR DISTRIBUTED CIPHER RETRIEVAL SYSTEM
Mimir is a distributed retrieval system for secret documents, which has two main functions: distributed indexing and dis tributed search. We will discuss each feature of Mimir in details after an overview of the architecture.
The components of Mimir include the clients, the man agement server, the index servers, the document servers, the random key database (RKDB) and the encryption server as shown in Figure constitute the distributed cipher index which is complete logically. The index server is also responsible for handling queries, so it also can be called the query server. The query is parsed into multiple search terms, and then these terms are sent to the corresponding index servers to perform queries, and finally the results are transferred back to the management server to merge. In the indexing and querying processes, the terms are encrypted through the encryption server, and a term obtains the key stored in RKDB through its hash value. In the front end, Mimir sets a flexible access control policy to protect sensitive data from unauthorized access; in the back end, encryption takes care of data leakage from illegal use.
A. Load Balanced Term distribution
Although the term distribution has better search efficiency, such as less disk access, than the document distribution, there is an evident lack of balance in the load distribution of the index servers. Suppose that r documents are parsed into m terms, then the number of terms S t which are assigned into each index server in term distribution is refined in equation (1).
Where p is the number of index servers. Therefore, each index server is assigned the same number of terms. Suppose the index server IA owns the terms set TA = (tl' t2, ... , ts,), and the frequency of a term t is defined as ! (t). The term frequency of index server IA is refined in equation (2) .
Since the frequencies of terms are different, according to Zipf's law, the term frequency of each index server is also dif ferent even with the same number of terms. Higher frequency of a term results in more documents containing the term whose posting list may be a bit longer. If !(IA) > !(IB), the index size of server IA is bigger than the size of server lB. In the query, the load of index server I A will be greater than the load of index server lB.
In this paper, to ensure load balancing, the load balanced term distribution will be adopted instead of random term distribution. Most of the terms are low frequency terms, and imbalanced load caused by the low-frequency terms is small because the frequency interval between them is very little.
In order to improve efficiency, the low frequency terms are assigned to the index servers with a random term distribution strategy. For the high-frequency term, the management server records the f(I) of each index server, where f(I) denotes the high-frequency term frequency of the index server, and the management server establishes a list L(ter-rn, index server)
for the allocated terms. In the distribution process, the low frequency words were randomly assigned to the index server.
If a high-frequency term t is not in the list L, it would be assigned to an index server 1 with minimal f(I), and the man agement updates f(I) of the index server 1 by f(I) + = f(t). This is presented in Algorithm 1. The terms are the most important part of the inverted index because the documents can be deduced from them. To ensure security of document data, it is necessary to ensure the safety of inverted index. The best way is to encrypt the index as a whole, but it would greatly reduce the efficiency of retrieval.
In this paper, we only encrypt the terms in the index in order to make a system both safe and efficient. To process the massive collection of secret documents, we can build cipher index over multiple index servers. The distributed cipher index proposed in this paper is described in Figure 2 . The cipher index which is wholly logical is separated into multiple index servers through term distribution.
There is a high risk of statistical attack because the posting RKDB has two functions: to store the key and protect the key, as a result, RKDB must be an encrypted database. Table I shows the data structure storing the key. Serial number (SN)
indicates the key position in RKDB, and a term can obtain its key according to SN. The "Temp Key" field temporarily stores the new key during key update, and replaces the key with it when the index update is complete. The "Terms" field in Table 1 indicates the terms set using the corresponding key.
This information is used for partial key update which will be discussed in the following section. Supposing the number of key stored in RKDB is M, then the method that a term obtains a key is: the hash value of the term mod M and obtain the key from RKDB according to the result. For example, the hash value of "Chinese" is 1031, and M is 5000, thus the key for "Chinese" can obtain from RKDB through the remainder 1031. At the same time, the word "Chinese" will be insert into the corresponding terms set if the set does not contain it.
The method of obtaining a key from RKDB is presented in 
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Where n is the number of terms in index. Therefore, the time complexity of entire index rebuilding is 0(n 2 ). 
D. Access Control in Mimir
To answer user queries, Mimir enforces access control based on role and user on its posting elements. Upon query, Figure 3 is stored in the management server and encrypted as a whole. When Mimir is initiated, the ACI is decrypted and placed into memory. The posting list of ACI forms the access control bitmap for the indexed documents. The term of ACI includes roles and users, and the corresponding posting list contains n bits, where n is the number of documents. The" I" in Figure 3 indicates the role or user can access the corresponding document and the "0"
can not. Mimir can set access permission for role as well as user, which increases system availability and flexibility.
Suppose user u has a role set R = (TO, ... , Ti), and query q can be parsed into a term set T = (t o , ... , t j ). Let, Sti is the result set of query term ti. Sr.; is the result set of query role rio SUi is the result set of query user Ui.
The search authority set SAC ( u , R ) for user u is defined in equation (4) .
If there is u in ACL, we filter the search results only according to Su, otherwise, based on Sr where user u has role r.
The result set Sq for query q is defined in equation (5) .
For example, a user u has role set r1, r3, the query q is "Beijing Olympic". The query result is refined as following: In this paper, we dynamically adjust the size of pipelined search based on the traffic load of the management server.
In search, the retrieval words are analyzed into multiple search terms, and there is multiple index servers corre sponding to these search terms. Let search group Si = { 5i, (til, ti2, ... , tin)} to express that the terms (til, ti2, ... , tin) should be searched in the index server Si. Suppose that query Q is parsed into n search groups (Sl, S2, ... Sn). If the load of the management server is more than 90% of full load, Mimir take full pipelined search to relieve the load of management server. That is the management server sends search group (Sl, S2, ... Sn) to the index server Sl to search the terms (tn, t12, ... , t1n), then the index server Sl sends the remaining search group (S2, ... Sn) to the index server S2 to search the terms (t21' t22, ... , t2n) and the index server S2 merges its results with the results from the previous index server, and so on. In this way, the management server has low communication load because it only receives the results from the last index server, however, this full pipelined search increases search delay. [f the load of the management server is about 60% of full load, the management server divides the search group in half and runs two pipe lined search. If the load of the management server is less than 30% of full load, the management server does not take pipelined search strategy and sends the query to the index servers (51,82, ... 8n) to parallel search. The last approach has the best search delay and maximum communication overhead. According to dynamical pipelined search, we can obtain a better traffic load and delay.
FUsing Mimir
In this section, we will describe distributed indexing and search in Mimir. 2) Distributed Search: To execute a keyword query, the management server firstly authenticates the user. [f the authen tication is passed, the management server searches AC[ based on the user u and its role set R, and obtains the search authority SAC ( u , R ) according to the equation (4) . Processing queries in a distributed fashion consists of determining which resources to allocate from a distributed system when processing a particular query. Secondly, Mimir parses the query into multiple terms, and the parsing method is the same with indexing. To assign the retrieval terms to correct index servers, the distribution strategy which gets the index server location of the term based on the term hash value is similar to indexing. The method that a retrieval term obtain its corresponding index server is described in Algorithm 3. Then the retrieval terms obtain their key through Algorithm 2, and are encrypted into the cipher re trieval terms at the encryption server. Thirdly, the management server sends the cipher retrieval terms and their SAC ( u , R ) to the corresponding index servers to perform dynamic pipelined search based on its load. [n the index servers, also can be called query servers as previous description, the cipher retrieval terms are searched over cipher index with filter condition SAC ( u , R ) , and the result is merged with the result from the previous index server, and the merged result is returned to the next index server or the management server. system. Since only the terms are encrypted, the search strategy of Mimir is the same with the plain retrieval engines through converting the plain term into the cipher term. Compared to the overall encrypted index, Mimir greatly improves the retrieval efficiency. Meanwhile, the encryption and the access control can guarantee the security of the secret documents as well. In this section, we discuss Mimir's security guarantees and then discuss its load compared to the document distribution and normal term distribution, indexing performance and query performance, using the Reuter Corpus whose volume is I.SSG.
The hardware used in all the experiments described in this section is a Beowulf-sty Ie cluster of 7 computers, each a 2.SGHz Intel Xeon with 2GB RAM and 1 TB local S ATA disk in a RAID-S configuration. One of the cluster acts as the management server in which the encryption card replacing the encryption server and RKDB are installed, and the other six computers are acted as both the index servers and the document servers.
A. Security Guarantees
The encryption scheme can protect data privacy and data authenticity against adversaries that have access to the index on a low enough level to bypass the access control scheme.
In Mimir, the secret documents are encrypted and stored in Partial key update can disturb the correspondence between term and key, and is low cost because Mimir does not rebuild the whole index. Therefore, Partial key update can be done anytime to enhance system security further.
B. Load Balance
The major issue for throughput, in fact, is an uneven distribution of the load across the index servers. Figure 4 illustrates the average busy load for each of the 6 Number of index servers 
C Indexing Performance
In order to discuss the efficiency of the index build, we analyze the indexing throughput which is the number of articles whose volume is about 2k to be indexed in one second, and the indexing time which is the total time spent on all tasks performed to index a collection of a given size. We take the Mimir with plain indexing (PI) and block encryption indexing (BEl) to conduct a comparative analysis. PI is no encryption inverted index strategy which is commonly used.
BEl divides the entire index into multiple blocks, and then encrypts each block as whole, which is another project of our research item. Although Mimir does not encrypt the index as a whole, it also can ensure the security of the data through some mechanisms discussed above. Mimir can maintain the similar efficiency with plain indexing, and guarantee the data security as well.
D. Query Performance
We evaluate effectiveness of query processing by analyzing latency of queries in which query latency is represented by the average response time required to process a query. In order to analyze the efficiency of DPS, we let Mimir take the pipelined approach (PA) proposed by Moffat [22] as search strategy to compare performance. Figure 6 (b) plots the average search delay over 500 queries at a time for Mimir and PA.
When there are a lot of concurrent queries, the search delay of Mimir and PA is similar because the pipelined search of Mimir is the same with PA. However, when the management server is not busy, Mimir do not take pipeline search strategy to decrease the search delay. Therefore, Mimir can improve system efficiency compared to PA.
V. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
We present Mimir, a distributed cipher retrieval system for sensitive documents. Mimir constructs the distributed indexes based on term distribution for storing the index in a load balanced way. Mimir takes encryption, key update, and access control to protect sensitive data, in which it encrypts the terms in indexes with random key for safety and efficiency, it utilizes partial key update to decrease the potential risk of attacks by malicious users, it uses the access control based on role and user to control users to access the authorized data. It uses dynamic pipe lined search strategy to balance the load of the management server and reduce the search delay. Our (a) Query response time � 800 r--r--r--r--r--r--r--r--r--r-.
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x-x-�xx7'. Concurrent Query number experiments show that Mimir can effectively protect secret data and answer queries almost as fast as an ordinary inverted index.
Currently, the index scale of Mimir is three million docu ments, and the search can be achieved on average 0.3 second.
Our objective is to support larger data collection with similar search response. A challenging extension is to improve the scalability of term distribution in Mimir. Increasing new index servers will lead to changing the structure of the distributed cipher index. By doing so, the entire index needs to be recon structed, which has a very large overhead. Another interesting question is how to protect the information of the posting list without encrypting it as whole, which can guarantee not to leak probabilistic information without sacrificing retrieval efficiency.
